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Summary findings
In  1985,  after  decades  of an  import-substitution  She finds that  reductions  in quota  coverage  and tariff
industrial  strategy,  Mexico  initiated  a radical  levels are associated  with  moderate  reductions  in firm-
liberalization  of its external  sector.  Between  1985  and  level employment.  A 10-point  reduction  in tariff levels
1988,  import  licensing  requirements  were  scaled  back to  (between  1985 and  1990)  is associated  with  a 2- to 3-
a quarter  of earlier  levels,  reference  prices  were  removed,  percent  decline  in employment  in Mexico.
and  tariff  rates  on most  products  were  substantially  Changes  in quota  coverage  appear  to have no
reduced.  By  1989,  Mexico  was one  of the  most  open  discernible  effect  on wages,  but  reductions  in tariff  levels
economies  in the  developing  world.  are  associated  with  increases  in average  wages.  This
Adjusting  to  trade  liberalization  required  the  seems  to reflect  improved  productivity  in the  reformed
reallocation  of resources  betweeni sectors  and entailed  industries,  which  may  be related  to a shift  toward  the  use
substantial  dislocation  of workers.  Revenga  analyzes  how  of more  skilled workers.
Mexico's  trade  liberalization  (1985-87)  affected  There  seems to  have been  a slight shift  in the skill  mix
employment  and  wages  in industry,  focusing  on  how  it  in favor  of  nonproduction  workers.  This was paralleled
affected  average  employment  and  earnings  rather  than  by a sharper  increase  in the wage differential  between
on the  link between trade  and  relative  wages.  She  skilled and  unskilled  workers.  The  wages  and
examines the tradeoff  between  wage  and employment  employment  of skilled  production  workers  were
adjustment,  identifies  which  labor  groups  benefited  more  significantly  more  responsive  to changes  in protection
from  liberalization,  and  tries  to associate  changes  in  levels than  those  of nonproduction  workers  - perhaps
employment  and  wages  directly  with  measures  of change  partly  because  production  workers  were  more  heavily
in trade  protection,  rather  than  link them  to changes  in  concentrated  in the industries  in which  protection  levels
imports  and  exports  (which  is more  common).  were  grearly  reduced.
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In 1985,  after decades of pursuing an import-substitution  industrialization  strategy,
Mexico  initiated  a radical  liberalization  of its external  sector. The scope and speed  of this trade
liberalization  episode is apparent from Table 1.1 Between 1985 and 1988, import licensing
requirements  were scaled back to about a quarter of their previous levels, reference prices
were removed  and tariff rates on most products  substantially  reduced. By 1989, Mexico was
one of the most  open economies  in the developing  world.
Adjusting to this episode of trade liberalization  required a substantial reallocation  of
resources  between sectors of the Mexican economy. On the whole, the process was fairly
smooth and  its  costs  in  terms of  aggregate unemployment quite  moderate:  Mexico's
unemployment  rate rose to 4.4% in 1985, but was back down to  2.9% by  1989.  One
explanation for  the  absence of  large  aggregate employment effects was  the  flexibility
demonstrated  by real wages,  which declined  significantly  throughout  the adjustment  period.
However,  while on the aggregate  the employment  costs of the liberalization  may have
been fairly small,  there is no doubt that at the sectoral  level there was substantial dislocation
of workers.  Understanding  how adjustment occurred at this level -- whether there was a
tradeoff between employment  and wage responses, and how this may have varied across
sectors -- could provide essential insights as to the broader workings of the Mexican labor
market.  This seems particularly relevant in the wake of  the implementation  of the North
American  Free Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA),  as further labor  reallocation  is expected.
Beyond  its interest in relation  to the potential  effects of NAFTA,  Mexico's  recent  trade
liberalization  experience  can be relevant  to many other developing  countries embarking  on a
similar process. One of the key concerns  regarding  any liberalization  episode is its potential
effects on  employment and  wages  in  the  affected  sectors.  Understanding what  the
employment  costs were in the Mexican  case, and how they may have been dampened,  may
thus provide  some useful lessons.
1  For a careful  account  of the Mexican  trade liberalization  experience  see Ten  Kate  (1992).
2With these general objectives  in mind, this study analyzes  the impact of the Mexican
trade liberalization  of 1985-87 on employment  and wages in the industrial  sector. The paper
examines the tradeoff between wage and employment  adjustment, and analyzes whether
certain groups  of labor benefitted  more,  in relative  terms,  from the liberalization.  The data used
for the analysis are plant-level data drawn from the Annual Industrial  Survey, and cover a
panel of medium-to-large  firms over the 1984-1990  period. These data were combined with
import  penetration  ratios  at the sector level, and with tariff-line  and license-coverage  data.
This paper is part of a new wave of interest in the Mexican labor market.  Motivated
partially by the U.S. literature  on trade and rising inequality,  a number  of recent papers have
investigated  the impact of trade on the Mexican  wage structure. Results so far are are fairly
mixed: most coincide in finding a rising trend for wage inequality  in Mexico,  but differ widely
when it comes  to its explanation. Feliciano  (1994), for example,  uses household-level  data to
examine the  effect of  liberalization on  the  retums to  schooling. She  finds that  wage
differentials  between skilled and unskilled workers increased between 1986 and 1990 and
attributes  this increase  to trade reform. Craig and Epelbaum  (1994) document  a similar rise in
eamings  dispersion  during the late 1980s, but associate  it instead to a rise in the demand  for
educated  workers resulting  from the complementarity  between  skilled  labor and investment  in
capital. Finally , Hansen and Harrison (1994) use both plant-level data and data from the
Mexican  Industrial  Census  to assess  whether increased  wage inequality  in Mexico  was linked
to  trade liberalization.  They find little evidence of  Stolper-Samuelson  type effects, and
conclude that changes in Mexico's  wage structure are driven mostly by developments  within
industries.
This paper adds to the recent literature in several key aspects.  First, it pays more
explicit attention  to employment  developments. Second, unlike  the other papers, it focuses  on
the impact  of trade liberalization  on average  employment  and earnings,  rather than on the link
between  trade and relative  wages.  Third, it attempts  to associate  changes  in employment  and
wages directly  to measures  of changes  in trade protection,  instead  of linking them to changes
in imports  and exports,  as has been more  common.
3The rest of the paper is organized  as follows. Section 11  lays down the main model to
be used as framework  for the empirical  analysis. Section III presents  the data and some basic
descriptive statistics. Section IV shows the main econometric  results.  Section V examines
what has happened  to skilled-unskilled  wage differentials  in response  to trade liberalization.
Finally,  Section  VI concludes.
II. Estimating the Impact of Trade on Employment and Wages
This section outlines a simple model in which nominal wages are predetermined  by
negotiation  at the firm level, and employment  is then set unilaterally  by the firm after aggregate
prices and demand levels are known.  I begin by developing the analysis of employment
determination,  and then move on to consider how wages are set.  This yields some simple
reduced-form  equations  for employment  and wages. I then consider  how these equations  may
be extended  to incorporate  the effects  of trade.
EmDlovment
Assume  that there are i identical  firms in each industry,  and that each has a constant
returns  to scale technology  of the form:
(1)  Yi,- ki  = a[ni,-ki,I]+  Ei+
where yf is the output of firm i in period t, ki equals the capital stock of firm i in period t, nR
equals  the firm's employment  in that period,  and en is a productivity  shock  which is assumed  to
be serially  uncorrelated. Note that all variables  are expressed  in terms of logarithms  and that
industry  subscripts  are ommitted  for simplicity.
Assume  also that firms produce  differentiated  products,  and that, therefore,  they face
downward-sloping  demand  curves  for their good. Let demand be allocated across firms as a
function  of relative  prices:
d  d
(2)  Y  -_Y = -_[P  -Pt]
4where yd represents  demand for firm i's product in perod t,  ytd  is total industry demand in
period t, pH  is the firm-specific  price, pt is the average industry price, and ?I equals the price
elasticity  of demand.
Profit-maximizing  firms will find it optimal  to set prices  as a markup  over marginal  cost:
(3)  Pj,  =-In(@)  +mci,  withS = l -
and where
(4)  mctt  = Wit  + (1  [yi  kit]  _n(a)
a  a
Combining  equations  (2), (3) and (4) yields  the following  price equation:
(5)  p  =-In(aO)+wit+  (-  a),  (p,tPt)+yd  -kJ  - a
a  a
Equation (5) can then be combined  with equation (1) to obtain an expression for firm-level
employment:
(6)
flit  c + (2 - 1)  kit - 77A(wz  -pt)  +  Iy  -(2-
a
where  c = 2771n(a0)
a + iff]- a)
/
Waae Determination
Assume  that wage setting  is decentralized,  and that as in many  standard  union models,
wage bargainers  want to maximize  the expected income of the representative  worker.  The
union,  thus, sets real wages so as to maximize  an objective  function of the type:
5(7)  max V = ;r(w)  *  w + (1- r(w)) *  wA
subject to employment  being  on the labor demand  curve. Note that nr(w)  equals  the probability
that the representative  worker will be employed in firm i the following period (which is a
decreasing  function of the negotiated  wage), and wA  represents  the "fall-back"  or altemative
real wage (ie. the wage the worker  will receive  if he/she gets laid off).
If we assume  that the union's  target employment  level is simply  the employment  level in
the previous  period,  nit-,,  we can write the objective  function  as: 2
(8)  max  nit  (Wit) . nit-,  -nit  (Wit) 
nit-,  nit-,
The standard  solution  to this type of bargaining  model  is of the form: 3
(9)  <(  it  -W  = (nit  - nit-l)
where G is the wage elasticity of labor demand. Adding and subtracting  kit to the right-hand
side, and then substituting  in from equation (6) for (nit - kit) gives us an expression for the
negotiated  wage:
/
2  We are assuming  that the union  cares only  about the interests  of workers  who are currently  employed  (ie. its
objective  is to maintain  employment  at current levels). This is consistent  with the popular  "insider-outsider'  type of
models  which have been developed  to explain  the persistence  of European unemployment  (see, for example,
Lindbeck  and Snower  (1988);  Layard,  Nickell  and Jackman  (1991),  Dolado  and Bentolila  (1992)).
3  See,  for example,  Layard,  Nickell  and Jackman  (1991),  De Lamo and Dolado  (1991) or Dolado  and Bentolila
(1992).
6(10) ~~~~~~~  +Ard  (A2-  J)ay
Wit  = Cr  + cw,t  + icy-lt  -ani--(  )a ki,  + 
6
it
witha  =  _  _
(4+ 77A)
We now  have  an expression  for firm-level  employment  (eq.  6) and  firm-level  wages  (eq.
10).  The next step is to introduce  tariffs and quotas  into our framework,  so as to obtain
expressions  that  allow  us  to relate  employment  and  wages  to trade  liberalization  measures.
Introducina  Licensina  and  Tariffs
The  two  key  elements  of Mexican  trade  policy  prior  to the liberalization  were  a system
of quantitative  restrictions  encompassing  both  quotas  and licenses,  and  an ad valorem  import
tariff  scheme  .4  We  consider  the  modeling  of each  in tum.
In analyzing  the impact of  QRs we  distinguish  between licensing  of  imported
intermediate  inputs,  and that of final output.  As regards  the former,  we can model  the
reduction  of import  restrictions  as the release  of a binding  constraint  on  one factor,  in  our case
k,. Using  equations  (1),  (3)  and  (4)  we have:
(11)  Y, =  ki+  [pi,  - Wit]
where  denotes  the constrained  factor. It is then clear that a reduction  in licensing  of
intermediate  inputs  should  increase  output  and,  to the extent  that labor  and the constrained
input are complements  in the production  process,  should  also lead to an increase  in the
amount  of labor  employed.
'4 These  two instruments  were complemented  by a set  of official  minimum  prices  for custom  valuation. However,
in this paper  we ignore  the role of these  reference  prices. For a description  of the Mexican  trade policies  and their
evolution  through  the 1980s,  see Ten  Kate  (1992).
7We then tum to the impact of import licensing  on final output. Assume that domestic
and foreign goods are imperfect  substitutes,  so that demand is a function of relative prices.
And let 8 represent  the coverage  of the quantitative  import restrictions. We can then express
the fraction of total domestic demand for an industry's good that is allocated to domestic
producers  in terms of relative  prices and the coverage  of the import restrictions. Letting lower
case letters  denote logaritms,we  have:
(12)  Yt  dt = In(J-S)+  O[,  -p,]
where ddt  reflects total domestic demand for the industry's  good, (1-8) is the fraction of total
demand not covered by restrictions,  and -p  is the price of the import good which, in tum, is
assumed  to be given by:
(13)  p,=p  (I+  tariff)
with p equal  to the world price  of the import  good.
Making use of equations (11) through (13), we can rewrite our employment  and wage
equations  (6) and (10) as:
(14)
n.k =a0 +a  (r.  -p p,)-a(w 1 -p)+a(vtp) nit = aO +l(it  ~ it )  2 (it  -Pt  )  3 (vit  -Pd )
b, [dd + ln(I -lcqj 1 ) +  91n(1 + tariff.  ) + 6(p  - )]+ c  ln(lci,t) +6it
with a1+a 2+a 3=0, and
(15)  wit  =  aoa  + CUwit  + a, a(rit -pt)  + a3a(vit -pt) +
bi a[dd, + In(l -Icq,t)  + OIn(J + tariff i,) + O(pt  -pt)] - a nizt-  + cl a ln(lci 2t) + vit
8where (ra-pt)  is the user cost of capital, (vit-p,)  is the real price of materials, lcqft  reflects the
coverage  of quotas or licenses  on output,  and lcit reflects  the coverage  of licenses  on inputs.
Equations (14) and (15) can be estimated jointly using Generalized Least Squares
(GLS).
Ill.  Data Description and Basic Statistics
The  data used  in  the  empirical analysis are drawn from  the  plant-level Annual
Manufacturing  Survey.  The sample covers the period 1984-1990  and includes,  within each
sector, all plants sorted by decreasing  order of size to account for roughly 80% of cumulative
value added. Out of the 3218 plants included in the original survey, 2354 were selected for
the analysis. 5 A very similar  dat set has been used to study the impact  of the liberalization  on
productivity  and performance,  by Tybout and Westbrook  (1992), and by Grether (1993). The
latter provides, in an appendix,  a detailed description  of the variables included in the survey
and of their construction. 8
The plant-level  data  were combined  with measures  on tariff rates, and license  coverage
on inputs and output calculated by the Mexican Trade Ministry (SECOFI), and with import
penetration ratios at the 3-digit sector level. 7 Since the survey data do not include price
variables,  these  were taken  from more  aggregated  sources. Producer-prices  were obtained  at
the 4-digit Mexican  sectoral classification  level and merged  with the firm data. An aggregate
wholesale price index, and a  price index for  raw materials were also added. Finally, we
5 Observations  dropped  included:  (a) those  with zero or negative  values for gross output,  value added  and total
costs;  (b) those presenting  large,  erratic changes  from year  to year  in the key  variables;  and (c) those  with extreme
values  for some  of the essential  variables  relative  to other  plants  in the same  sector.
a One important  characteristic  of the sample  is that it is closed  -ie. only plants  with observations  for every  year
of  the sample  period  are included.  This could  introduce  a potentially  important  selectivity  bias into our analysis,
since  neither  firms entering  or exiting  a sector  during  this period  would be captured  in the sample. Unfortunately,  I
was not able  to obtain  the complete  unbalanced  panel.
7  Import  penetration  ratios  at the 3-digit ISIC  level  were available  for 1984-87. Similar ratios  at the 2-digit level
were available  for the complete  sample  period,  1984-90.
9incorporated  two altemative  measures  for the "fallback"  wage. One is the average  wage in the
state, which was drawn from the Industrial  Census for several years.  The other one is the
official minimum  wage.
Means and standard deviations  of the key variables are presented  in Table 2.  These
averages  confirm that the sample comprises primarily  large plants, although there is clearly
substantial  variation  both between  and within industries. It is interesting  that, despite  the trade
liberalization  measures,  the mean import penetration  ratio actually  declined  between  1984 and
1987. This reflects  the fact that the impact  of the liberalization  was intentionally  delayed by a
sharp 27% real depreciation  of the peso in 1985 and 1986 (see Ten Kate, 1992). By 1987,
however,  the depreciation  had been reversed  and the impact of the trade reforms began to
bite.  Between 1987 and  1990, the  mean  import penetration ratio practically doubled,
increasing  from 8.7%  to 16.2%.
Table  3 presents means and standard  deviations  for log changes  in the key variables
over the 1984-1986  and 1986-1990  periods.  The table subdivides  the sample  into three  groups
of industries  according  to their initial  protection  levels,  and presents  separate  statistics  for each
subgroup.  To define the three industry categories, I first ranked industries  by initial protection
levels (tariffs plus quotas): the top third was classified as high initial protection industries
(roughly  those  with quotas  close to 100 percent  of production  and tariffs of above  40 percent);
the second third as medium initial protection (quotas of  above 80 percent and tariffs of
between  20 and 40 percent);  and the bottom third as low initial protection  (for details on each
3-digit  industry  see Table 5).
The two phases of the liberalization  process  are clearly  apparent from Table 3. During
the first phase, 1985-86,  import quotas were removed and substituted for tariff-equivalents.
Accordingly, there were small overall reductions in average tariffs (of  approximately  -1.3
percentage  points) but large decreases  in quota coverage  (on average of -67.2 percent). In
the second phase,  tariff levels  were brought  down and remaining  quotas removed.  The largest
overall declines in protection  rates occurred in those sectors which had previously been less
exposed to  import competition. However, the  pattern of  liberalization differed somewhat
between industries: those classified as initially highly protected faced significantly smaller
declines in quota coverage  during  the first round of reforms  and larger  ones during  the second
10round than did the other sectors. Tariff reductions, on the other hand, were larger for the
initially  protected  sectors  throughout  the whole period.
Between  1984  and 1986, real output  fell significantly  in all industries,  as did real wages.
The evolution  of employment  was somewhat  more  mixed:  some sectors  experienced  stagnant
employment  or even employment  reductions,  while others saw their employment  levels grow.
Output recovered  following the reforms, growing on average by nearly 4 percent.  However,
sector performance diverged considerably,  with the  initially more-open industries showing
stronger growth.  For the period as a whole (1984-90),  industries classified  as initially more
protected  experienced  lower employment  growth over the period (measured  both in terms of
workers  and total hours),  as well as sharper  real wage declines.
The statistics  presented  in Table 3 suggest  that both the magnitude  of trade reform  and
its impact  have differed  significantly  across  industries,  with the initially highly  protected  sectors
bearing the largest adjustment burden.  In order to understand  how trade reform may have
played itself  out  through the  Mexican labor market, the  next  step  is  to  examine the
characteristics  of the more affected sectors. Table 4 ranks 3-digit industries  by descending
level  of protection,  and presents  some  basic statistics  by industry.
Several features stand out from this table.  First, industries  with high initial protection
levels tended to be lower wage and more labor intensive  than those with less protection. 8
Sectors  such as ceramics,  apparel,  footwear and furniture,  for example,  were among the most
protected,  while industries  like chemicals,  steel and non-electrical  machinery  were relatively
more open. The rank correlation between  total levels of initial protection  and real wages is -
0.52 (significant  at the .05 level), confirming  that sectors  with relatively  low wages initially had
higher tariff rates and import quotas. Second,  import penetration  was significantly lower in
highly-protected,  labor-intensive  industries than in more open, capital-intensive  sectors.  In
1984, import penetration  rates in ceramics,  apparel and footwear were all under 3 percent.  In
contrast, imports accounted for  20 percent of total consumption (output plus imports) in
chemicals,  31 percent  in non-electrical  machinery,  and as much as 60 percent in electrical
machinery.  Third, relative prices have fallen more in those sectors that experienced  larger
8 This  is consistent  with  Feliciano's  findings  that  workers  in highly  protected  industries  had  lower  education  and
skills,  and  were  paid  less  than  those  in  less  protected  sectors.
11trade reform: the rank correlation between changes in relative prices and changes in tariff
levels is -0.57 (significant  at the .01 level), and the correlation between changes in relative
prices and changes  in total protection  (including  removal  of quotas) is -0.46 (significant  at the
.05 level). Import shares have also increased slightly more in the large reform industries:  on
average,  import  shares rose by 4 percentage  points among  the high reform  industries  and by 3
percentage points among the low reform ones.  Import penetration in apparel, for example,
increased  from 2.9 percent in 1984  to 8.6 percent in 1990.  Similariy,  import shares increased
from 5.3 percent  to 11.4 percent in glass products,  from 1.9 percent to 9.7 percent in textiles
and from 1.6 percent  to 5.1 percent  in footwear.
These overall patterns  suggest a link between  reduction  in protection  rates, increased
import competition, and  employment and wage  adjustment.  This  is  supported by  the
correlations  presented  in Table 5, which show a negative,  although  weak, correlation  between
changes  in import shares and changes in employment  for the post-reform  period.  The data
show a similarly  weak, negative  correlation  between  changes  in import  penetration  and output,
but a positive correlation between  the former and real wages.  The next section explores
these  associations  further in the econometric  analysis.
IV.  Results
The empirical  results  are based on the estimation  of equations  (14) and (15) described
above.  The dependent variable in equation (14) is annual employment,  measured both in
terms of average  workers over the year and total hours worked.  The independent variables
include the user cost of capital, the price of raw materials,  the real hourly product  wage,9  and
the protection  rate variables:  (a) the fraction of demand  not covered by import restrictions  (ie.
the inverse  of the license  coverage  of output),  (b) the average  tariff rate at the end of the year,
and (c) the license coverage of inputs.  All variables are expressed in logarithms, and all
nominal variables  are deflated by the producer  price index. To proxy for the evolution of total
demand  for the industry's  good, we have included  industry-specific  trends into our estimating
equations. 10 We also include  year effects  to control  for common  aggregate  shocks  that are not
9  Because  of potential  measurement  problems  with  the  hours  variable,  I also  tried  using  annual  income  rather
than  hourly  wages  as an  independent  variable.  The  results  obtained  were  similar  to  those  presented  here.
10 In  lieu  of  interactions  between  industry  and  year  dummies.
12otherwise captured by our specification.  In addition, to  allow for  the  possibility of  slow
employment adjustment, we  consider an  altemative specification that  includes lagged
employment  among  the right-hand  side variables.
The bargaining  model developed  in section 11  would suggest that the appropriate  wage
to use in equation (15)  would be the real consumer  wage --the nominal wage deflated by the
consumer price index.  However,  for consistency  with the employment  equation we have
opted for using the real product wage in this equation  as well.  The independent  variables are
the alternative  or "fallback"  wage (defined  as in section 1I1),  employment  lagged  one period,  the
user cost of  capital, the price of raw materials, and the  protection variables.  As  in the
employment  equation,  we include an industry-specific  trend and year effects. We also allow  for
a lagged dependent  variable  term. Again, all variables  are expressed  in logarithms.
Results are presented in Table 6.  This table shows both simple unconstrained  OLS
estimates  obtained by estimating  the employment  and wage equations separately,  and also
those obtained from estimating the two equations jointly by GLS.  The OLS results for
employment  levels are presented  in columns (1) and (2), while those for hours are shown in
columns  (3) and (4). OLS estimates  for the hourly  wage equation are presented  in columns  (5)
and (6). Joint estimates  for the employment  and wage equations  are given in columns  (7) and
(8), while  joint estimates  for the hours  and wage equations  are shown  in columns (9) and (10).
Both sets of estimates  --OLS and GLS-- are very similar.
As regards  the employment  equations,  we obtain fairly reasonable  estimates  for factor
elasticities. The coefficient on the wage rate in the employment  equation is negative and
significant,  although as is often the case in employment  demand  equations  it is very low. It is
significantly  larger in the hours equation. Since we do not attempt to instrument  for the real
wage in either case, these coefficients  are probably downward  biased.  Although we do not
impose  the constraint,  the estimates  are consistent  with the restriction  that the elasticities  of
employment  with respect  to the three factor prices sum  to zero.
With respect  to the protection  variables,  our estimates  are again quite reasonable. We
obtain a negative and significant coefficient on the variable that captures the fraction of
demand not covered by import restrictions. This suggests that an increase  in the fraction of
13the  market not  covered by restrictions (that  is,  a  reduction in  coverage levels) lowers
employment  both in terms of workers and hours.  Interestingly,  the impact on number of
employees  is quite similar to the impact on hours, suggesting little change in the amount of
hours worked per employee."  Note that since all variables are entered in logarithms, the
coefficient  must be interpreted  as an elasticity.
The coefficient  on tariff rates is, as we would expect,  positive  and significant. Hence,  a
reduction  in tariff rates is associated  with a reduction  in employment  levels and total hours
worked.  Again, the impact on both employment  levels and hours worked are fairly similar.
Finally, with respect to licensing on inputs, we obtain a negative and significant estimate,
suggesting an effect that goes in the opposite direction from that of licensing on output: a
reduction  of restrictions  on imported  inputs,  appears  to have a positive  effect on employment.
My results  for employment  contrast strongly with those obtained by Feliciano (1994),
who does not find an impact  of trade liberalization  on industry-elevel  employment. However,
Feliciano  (1994) is analyzing  total employment  at the industry level, while I examine  firm-level
employment.12 Oks (1993) has suggested that much of  the improvement in  productivity
following the reforms has occurred  through within-industry  changes in employment. Hence,
the effects of trade liberalization  may not show up in net industry employment. Moreover,
Feliciano's  employment  regressions  do not control for what happened  to wages.  If industries
experiencing  large tariff reductions  offered larger wage declines, the effects on employment
may have been dampened.  Without controlling  for wage developments, it may be hard to
isolate  the impact  of the changes  in protection  levels.
In both the worker and hours equations,  the lagged dependent variable term appears
large and strongly significant. We interpret  this as a sign of sluggish employment  adjustment,
which is consistent  with the existence of substantial  employment  protection. In any case, it
11  This finding contrast strongly with the experience  of, for example, European  countries,  in which much of
adjustment  to demand  shocks  appear  to occur  via changes  in hours  worked  rather  than via changes  in employment
levels. See  Abraham  and Houseman  (1993).
12  Note  also  that Feliciano  (1994) uses  employment  data  from the National  Accounts. These  data may differ
significantly  from those  of the Manufacturing  Survey  because  they reflect  estimates  of employment  based  on the
national  account  output  data,  rather  than actual  employment  levels.
14suggests  that the dynamics  of the equations  are important.  However,  because of the limited
time-period  spanned  by our sample,  we have not experimented  with longer  lags.
The results  for the wage equations  are also quite satisfactory. The coefficients  on both
the altemative wage and on lagged employment  appear to  be correctly signed and are
significant. The results for the protection  variables are a bit more mixed, but nevertheless
reasonable. When the lagged real wage is ommitted  from the specification,  both the tariff rate
variable and the license coverage on imports come in as negative and significant.  The
coefficient on licensing of output, on the other hand, is insignificant. Although the results
weaken  somewhat  once a lagged dependent  variable  is included  in the specification,  the signs
remain  the same.
The estimates  suggest  that a reduction  in tariff rates is associated  with an increase in
real wages. A  priori, one may have expected the sign to  go the  other way, under the
assumption  that workers appropriate  part of the rents created through tariff protection.' 3 But
this does not seem to  be the case.  This finding is reinforced by the zero coefficent on
licensing  of output.  If workers had been able to appropriate  part of the rents created by the
existence of quotas, you would expect their removal to be associated  with a decline in real
wages.
One interpretation  of the finding  that tariff reductions  are associated  with increased  real
wages is that it reflects  an increase  in labor productivity  in response  to the trade reforms.' 4 A
complementary  explanation  is that the skill mix of employment  may be changing. If lower skill
or less senior  workers  were laid off in response  to the reforms,  tariff reductions  would then be
associated with an increase in the average wage (and also with an increase in average
productivity).
13  Revenga  (1993) finds that in the  U.S., increases  in  import competition are associated  with small, but
statistically  significant  real  wage declines,  and that these  declines  are larger in highly unionized  industries,  in which
workers  had presumably  been  more able  to appropriate  rents.
14 Combined  with the result  on employment,  this finding  suggests  that a reduction  in tariffs is associated  with a
(simultaneous)  reduction  in employment  levels  and increase  in wages.
15As with tariffs, the reduction in the licensing of  inputs appears to  be linked to  an
increase  in real wages. Again, this could reflect an improvement  in productivity,  resulting  from
the release  of the input constraint  that allows the firm to use more (imported)  capital and/or
other intermediate  inputs,  or from a change in the skill mix of employment  toward more skilled
workers.
To test whether the negative sign on the tariff variable is explained by productivity
increases,  I estimate  a version of equation (15) with value added per worker (as a proxy for
productivity)  entered as a right-hand side variable.  Because  of the potential endogeneity  of
the productivity  variable,  it is entered lagged  one period.  This equation  can be interpreted  as a
reduced-form  for wages that takes into account productivity  changes.  Results are shown in
Table 7.  As far as the employment  and hours equations are concemed,  adding value added
per worker to the equation does not greatly alter the estimated  coefficients for the protection
variables.  The results  for the wage equation are somewhat  more  interesting,  particularly  those
in column (6), which includes the lagged real wage as a independent  variable. As expected,
lagged value added per worker enters positively in the regression indicating a relationship
between  higher  productivity  and higher  real wages. The coefficient  on the portion of domestic
demand not covered by quotas is negative and significant, suggesting that a reduction in
quotas (an increase in  the fraction of  the  market not  covered by  restrictions), holding
productivity  constant,  reduces real wages. This is consistent  with workers having  appropriated
some  part of the quota rents prior to liberalization. Note, however,  that although significant  the
coefficient is very small, not quite -0.01. The coefficient on tariffs remains negative, but
becomes  insignificant  once the lagged dependent  variable is included  in the regression. This
finding can be taken as weak evidence that the link between tariff reductions and wage
increases  works through  productivity.
V. Trade Liberalization and Skilled-Unskilled Wage Differentials
The finding that tariff reductions are associated with increases in average wages,
suggests that the skill composition  of employment  in Mexican  manufacturing  may be shifting
towards more-skilled  or more-senior  workers.  This would be consistent with the increase in
skill differentials  documented  by Feliciano (1994), Craig and Epelbaum (1994) and Hansen
16and Harrison  (1994) among others.  Unfortunately,  the enterprise  data do not provide very
adequate  measures  of the skill composition  of employment. It is possible,  however,  to control
for the mix of production  versus non-production  workers,  and to interpret  changes in this mix
as changes  in the skill composition  of the workforce.
Table 8 presents  the ratio of production  workers  to total employment over the 1984-90
period, for all industries  and by initial protection  categories. It is interesting  to note that the
ratio is highest  in the high initial  protection  industries,  precisely  in those which experienced  the
largest reforms. This is consistent  with Feliciano's  (1994) finding that large-reform  industries
employed proportionally  more low-skilled  workers than did small-reform  ones.  Similarly,  the
proportion of production workers to total employment  is smallest in the originally low initial
protection  (or small-reform)  industries.
For manufacturing  as a whole,  the fraction of production  workers in total employent  has
decreased  slightly over the period,  which could indicate  a shift towards more skilled  workers.
This change in composition towards less use of production workers is fairly visible for the
medium and low  initial protection industry categories.  However, among the  high initial
protection  industries  the shift in skill mix has been negligible. What is much  more striking  than
the  change the  employment mix is  the  dramatic increase in the  skilled-unskilled wage
differential;  an increase  that is apparent among all industry  groups.  The ratio of the average
hourly non-production  to production  wages increased  from 2.115 in 1984 to 2.711 in 1990.
The skill wage differential  has increased the most among the  large reform industries  (those
with high levels of initial protection).
Table 9 presents  the results  obtained  from estimating  separate  employment  and wage
equations for production  and non-production  workers.  Since one would expect employment
(and wages) for production  and non-production  workers to be simultaneously  determined,  the
equations  are estimated  jointly using Generalized  Least  Squares.
The coefficients presented in Table 9 are fairly similar to those estimated from the
single aggregate  regression. The results  suggest  that production  worker employment  is more
responsive  to changes  in protection  levels  than that of non-production  workers. The estimated
elasticity of production  worker employment  with respect to a change in tariff levels is 0.27,
17whereas  that for non-production  employment  is 0.14. The results  also suggest that the wage
elasticity  of employment  is larger  for production  workers  than for non-production  employees.
The wages of non-production  workers  do not appear  to be very responsive  to changes
in protection  levels,  whereas  those of production  workers do seem to respond. Reductions  in
quota coverage  of imported  inputs are associated  with increases  in production  worker wages,
perhaps reflecting  increases in productivity  resulting from greater access to imported  capital
and/or other inputs.  Reductions in tariff levels are, again, associated  with higher wages,
suggesting that  the  production/non-production  breakdown is  not  sufficient to  control for
changes  in the skill mix of employment.
The fact that production  worker employment  is more  responsive  to tariff changes  than
non-production  employment  could possibly  be explained  by the fact that the former are more
highly concentrated  in the those industries  that experienced  large declines in protection. To
explore this  hypothesis, I  examine what  happened within  industries.  I  run  separate
employment and wage equations by  industry category.  I find that  in all  three industry
categories  employment  and wages of production  workers are substantially  more responsive  to
changes  in protection  levels  than those of non-production  workers. I also find, however,  bigger
responses  among the industries  that experienced  greater reform (namely  those with high or
medium  levels of initial protection). Hence,  the aggregate  results  appear  to be driven both by
differences in responsiveness  within industries  (with production  workers being more affected
by reform)  and  by cross-industry  variation  in the skill mix.
VI. Conclusions
This paper  has analyzed  the impact  of trade liberalization  on employment  and wages in
Mexican  manufacturing  using  a panel  data set of firms for the 1984-90  period. The paper finds
that reductions  in quota coverage  and in tariff levels are associated  with moderate  reductions
in firm-level  employment. According  to the results  of this paper, a 10 point reduction  in tariff
levels, such as that experienced  by Mexico  between  1985 and 1990, is associated  with a 2-3%
decline in employment. Changes in quota coverage  appear to have no discernible  effect on
wages.  But reductions  in tariff levels are associated  with increases  in average  wages.  This
18last result seems to reflect productivity  increases in the reformed industries,  which may be
related  to changes  in the composition  of labor  towards  higher-skilled  workers.
The data suggest that there has been a slight shift in the skill mix in favor of non-
production  workers.  This has been paralled  by a much  sharper  increase  in the skilled-unskilled
wage  differential.  When  equations are  estimated separately for  producton  and  non-
production  workers,  the paper finds that employment  and wages of the former are significantly
more responsive  to changes in protection levels than those of the latter.  This should be
atributed, in part, to the fact that production  workers are more heavily concentrated  in the
industries  that underwent  large reductions  in protection  levels.
19Table I
Mexico: Trade Protection in Manufacturing, 1985489
1985:Vl  1986:VI  1987:VI  1988:Vl  1989:VI  1990:VIl
Avg. Tariff'  23.5  24.0  22.7  11.0  12.6  12.5
(% ad valorem)
Maximum  Tariff  100.0  45.0  40.0  20.0  20.0  20.0
Coverage  of Import  92.2  46.9  35.8  23.2  22.1  19.9
Licensingb
Coverage  of Reference  18.7  19.6  13.4  0.0  0.0  0.0
Pricesb
*  Production-weighted.  Does  not include  the uniform  5% surcharge  that was abolished  in December,  1987.
b  Average  share of output  subject  to import  licensing  or reference  prices,  as a percentage  of total domestic  output.
Source: Hufbauer  and Schott  (1992),  Grether  (1993).
20Table  2
Sample  of Mexican  Manufacturing  Firms,  198440
Means  (s.d.) of Key  Variables
1984  1987  1990
Total  Employment  331.7  334.8  352.7
(636.9)  (637.1)  (688.4)
Production  Workers  231.7  231.9  245.3
(489.0)  (487.6)  (529.2)
Non-production  Workers  99.8  102.6  106.2
(173.9)  (179.8)  (189.8)
Real  Gross  Value  Outout  370.5  411.9  437.4
(millions  of 1980  MEX$)  (888.9)  (1117.8)  (1257.0)
Real  Value  Added  156.1  171.3  182.9
(millions  of 1980  MEX$)  (361.6)  (428.1)  (478.5)
Real  Monthly  Waqe  6981.4  6445.4  6835.4
(1980  MEX$)  (2942.6)  (2920.5)  (3548.7)
Production  Workers  5461.2  4932.4  4701.4
(2173.8)  (1969.8)  (2134.8)
Non-Production  Workers  10,353.5  9652.0  11,502.6
(6046.4)  (4736.9)  (6855.7)
Imoort  Penetration  Ratio (9)  12.7  8.7  16.2
(2-digit)  (16.1)  (11.5)  (15.2)
21Table 3
Long  Period  Changes:
Means  of Log  Changes  by Initial Protection  Level t
1984-1986
Log  Change  in:  All  Low IP  Medium  IP  High IP
Total  Emplovment  0.016  0.026  0.007  0.009
(0.389)  (0.245)  (0.215)  (0.245)
Total Hours  Worked  0.014  0.031  0.010  0.017
(0.428)  (0.295)  (0.229)  (0.287)
Real  Gross  Value  Output  -0.054  -0.042  -0.080  -0.042
(0.377)  (0.400)  (0.347)  (0.380)
Real  Hourly  Waae  -0.053  -0.050  -0.064  -0.046
b  (0.247)  (0.271)  (0.207)  (0.257)
Imoort  Penetration  Ratio  0.004  0.002  0.006  0.005
(0.029)  (0.042)  (0.024)  (0.011)
Averaae  Tariffb  -1.31  7.260  1.595  -13.583
(15.1)  (9.929)  (6.869)  (17.854)
Domestic  Production  covered  -67.2  -71.785  -77.930  -51.315
by Import  Licenses"  (37.2)  (30.749)  (27.673)  (46.150)
1986-1990
Log  Change  in:  All  Low  IP  Medium  IP  High IP
Total Emplovment  0.008  0.019  0.027  0.001
(0.521)  (0.375)  (0.361)  (0.342)
Total  Hours  Worked  0.022  0.034  0.041  0.011
(0.530)  (0.408)  (0.392)  (0.374)
Real  Gross  Value  OutDut  0.037  0.040  0.077  -0.002
(0.517)  (0.517)  (0.511)  (0.519)
Real Hourly  Waae  -0.021  0.021  -0.039  -0.050
(0.247)  (0.301)  (0.336)  (0.317)
Import  Penetration  Ratiob  0.031  0.028  0.030  0.035
(0.059)  (0.074)  (0.054)  (0.042)
Averaae  Tariffb  -17.31  -9.787  -17.456  -25.314
(9.3)  (7.748)  (7.716)  (4.307)
Domestic  Production  covered  -24.1  -10.759  -17.189  -45.565
by lmwort  Licensest  (36.5)  (23.204)  (27.527)  (45.595)
'  Industries  ranked  by total protection  levels  in 1984. Top third classified  as high initial protection  (quotas  of close
to 100  percent  of production  and  tariff rates  above  40 percent);  middle  third classified  as medium  protection  (quotas
of 80-100 percent  of production  and  tariffs of 20-40  percent);  bottom  third classified  as low protection.
b  Changes  in import penetration,  average  tariffs and  coverage  of import  restrictions  in levels.
22Table  4
Protection  Rates,  Import Ratios  and Hourly  Wages  by Industry,  1984'
3-digit  industry  Tariff Rate  License  Import  Real  ARelative  AReal  AEmployment
(isic)  (%)  Coverage  Share  (%)  Hourly  Pricec  waged  d
(%)  Wageb  1984-90  1984-90  1984-90
Beverages  (313)  81.7  100  0.4  33.79  -0.08  -0.056  0.16
Glass  products  (362)  60.0  100  5.3  42.74  -0.47  0.094  0.10
Ceramics  (361)  50.0  100  2.2  35.40  0.67  -0.027  0.26
Tobacco  (314)  50.0  100  0  35.15  -0.09  -0.132  -0.12
Apparel  (322)  50.0  100  2.9  26.17  0.01  -0.102  -0.001
Furniture  (332)  48.9  100  1.0  27.31  0.01  -0.111  0.04
Wood products  (331)  44.7  100  2.1  30.92  0.03  -0.185  -0.04
Footwear  (324)  42.0  100  1.6  26.97  -0.003  -0.102  -0.22
Nonmet  minerals  42.8  98.8  2.1  32.95  -0.06  0.017  -0.02
(369)  40.9  100  3.1  39.30  -0.24  -0.152  0.16
Misc.  goods  (390)  37.4  98.9  11.0  36.34  0.01  -0.121  -0.02
Pulp,  paper  (341)  31.2  100  3.9  53.86  0.03  -0.191  -0.02
Tires and  tubes  (355)  32.4  98.4  5.8  47.97  -0.10  0.056  0.13
Pharmaceuticals  39.8  89.6  12.0  35.06  -0.29  -0.072  0.02
(352)  36.6  85.3  1.9  35.30  -0.14  -0.153  -0.05
Metal  Products  (381)  26.7  94.7  16.1  39.61  -0.20  -0.124  0.17
Textiles  (321)  21.3  100  2.4  29.62  -0.14  -0.023  0.18
Transport  equip.  40.8  80.3  3.2  38.32  -0.31  -0.128  -0.02
(384)  20.7  100  0.9  34.71  -0.41  0.137  0.00
Food  products  (311)  30.1  90.5  10.1  30.82  -0.01  -0.061  0.09
Printing,  publish.  27.1  90.2  60.3  44.16  0.02  -0.062  0.09
(342)  13.5  100  23.3  58.90  -0.10  -0.186  0.38
Misc.  foods  (312)  23.7  89.8  26.4  44.61  0.39  -0.021  -0.002
Plastics  (356)  9.2  95.8  9.3  43.85  -0.34  -0.165  -0.20
Electrical  mach.  (383)  19.5  85.1  20.2  50.59  -0.12  0.109  0.13
Misc.  chemicals  (354)  22.0  76.0  31.1  44.38  -0.15  -0.058  0.08
Non-ferr  metals  (372)
Iron  and steel  (371)
Basic  chemicals  (351)
Non-elec  mach (382)
a  ~~~~~~~~~~bd Unweighted  averages  by industry.  In 1980  MexS. c  Change in industry price relative  to aggregate. d  Log
changes  1984-1990.
Industries  sorted  by descending  order  of  total protection  (tariff + license  coverage).
23Table 5
Long Period Changes:
Correlations ot Log Changes
19841986
dEMP  dMR  dGVO  dRHWAGE  dTARIFF  dLCQ
dEMP  1.00  -0.001  0.175  -0.025  -0.026  0.023
dMR  1.00  -0.021  0.035  -0.088  0.023
dGVO  1.00  0.037  -0.076  0.049
dRHWAGE  1.00  -0.014  0.009
dTARIFF  1.00  -0.506
dLCQ  1.00
1986-1990
dEMP  dMR  dGVO  dRHWAGE  dTARIFF  dLCQ
dEMP  1.00  -0.015  0.343  -0.021  -0.010  0.074
dMR  1.00  -0.057  0.010  0.051  -0.023
dGVO  1.00  0.074  -0.031  0.044
dRHWAGE  1.00  0.120  -0.002
dTARIFF  1.00  -0.076
dLCQ  1.00
dEMP  = change  in log  total employment
dMR  = change  in import penetration  ratio  (2-digit)
dGVO  = change  in log  gross  value of output
dRHWAGE  = change  in log  real hourly  wage
dTARIFF  = change  in ad valorem  tariff rate
dLCQ  = change  in fraction  of domestic  production  covered  by output  licenses.
24Table 6
Employment  and Wage Equations
Ordina  Least Squares
Independent Variable  Employment  Hours  Hourly Wage
(all in logs)  l
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Hourly Wage  -.077  -.036  -.209  -.107  -
(.015)  (.009)  (.016)  (.009)
Alternative Wage  _  _  _  - .231  .057
(.008)  (.005)
Cost of Capital  .528  .149  .546  .164  .104  .034
(.003)  (.003)  (.004)  (.003)  (.003)  (.002)
Price Raw Materials  -.410  -.129  -.394  -.120  -.109  -.033
(.024)  (.014)  (.024)  (.015)  (.013)  (.008)
1 -LCQ  -.156  -.045  -.128  -.036  -.001  -.007
(.012)  (.007)  (.013)  (.008)  (.007)  (.004)
1 + Tariff  .225  .075  .196  .066  -.076  -.010
(.016)  (.010)  (.016)  (.010)  (.009)  (.005)
LCI  -.105  -.026  -.100  -.029  -.017  -.001
(.006)  (.003)  (.005)  (.003)  (.003)  (.001)
Lagged Employmentb  .753  .741  -.016  -.018
(.005)  (.005)  (.004)  (.003)
Lagged Hourly Wage  _  _-  - _  .773
(.006)
Industry Trend  .413  .099  .604  .170  .290  .070
(.011)  (.006)  (.010)  (.007)  (.008)  (.006)
Year Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
R  2  .976  .991  .982  .993  .987  .995
'  Obtained by estimating eqs. (14) and (15) in the text. Standard errors in parenthesis.  LCQ=license coverage on output. LCI=license coverage on inputs.
b  Lagged dependent variable: employment in (1) and (2), hours in (3) and (4).
25Table 6 (cont)
Employment  and  Wage  Equations
Joint Estimation (GLS)
Independent  Variable  Emp.  |  Wage  Emp  |  Wage  Hours  |  Wage  Hours  Wage
(all in logs)  I  I  l  l
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Hourly Wage  -.130  - -.035  - -.245  - -.108  -
(.015)  (.009)  (.016)  (.010)
Altemative  Wage  - .222  - .231  - .231  - .231
(.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)
Cost  of Capital  .534  .109  .149  .105  .550  .108  .164  .105
(.004)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.004)  (.003)  (.004)  (.003)
Price  Raw Materials  -.417  -.102  -.129  -.109  -.398  -.111  -.120  -.109
(.024)  (.013)  (.014)  (.013)  (.024)  (.013)  (.015)  (.013)
1 - LCQ  -.159  .036  -.045  -.001  -.128  -.002  -.036  -.001
(.013)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.013)  (.007)  (.008)  (.007)
1 + Tariff  .224  -.078  .076  -.076  .194  -.074  .067  -.076
(.016)  (.009)  (.010)  (.009)  (.016)  (.009)  (.010)  (.009)
LCI  -.106  -.014  -.026  -.017  -.101  -.017  -.029  -.017
(.006)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.006)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)
Lagged Employmentb  - - .753  -.016  - - .740  -.016
(.005)  (.004)  (.005)  (.004)
Industry  Trend  .438  .308  .098  .290  .621  .293  .170  .290
(.011)  (.009)  (.007)  (.008)  (.011)  (.008)  (.007)  (.008)
Year Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
RMSE  .734  .414  .437  .394  .737  .394  .452  .394
x2  10.439  10.439  0.004  0.004  5.323  5.323  0.009  0.009
a  Obtained  by estimating  eqs.  (14) and (15) in the text jointly via GLS.  Standard  errors  in parenthesis.
b  x2 test for independence  of  the employment  and wage  equation  residuals.
26Table 7
Reduced-Form  Employment  and  Wage Equations  with Lagged  Value  Added  per  Worker
Ordinary Least Squares
Independent  Variable  Employment  Hours  Hourly  Wage
(all in logs)
(1)  1  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Hourly  Wage  .040  -.005  -.100  -.077  -
(.015)  (.008)  (.016)  (.008)
Alternative Wage  _  _  _  - .184  .055
(.007)  (.005)
Cost  of Capital  .547  .130  .560  .142  .052  .027
(.004)  (.003)  (.004)  (.003)  (.003)  (.002)
Price  Raw Materials  -.420  -.109  -.428  -.119  -.076  -.031
(.022)  (.011)  (.022)  (.012)  (.012)  (.008)
1  - LCQ  -.133  -.029  -.116  -.025  -.007  -.009
(.012)  (.006)  (.012)  (.006)  (.006)  (.004)
1 + Tariff  .204  .060  .185  .053  -.047  -.006
(.015)  (.007)  (.014)  (.008)  (.008)  (.005)
LCI  -.087  -.016  -.086  -.020  -.034  -.006
(.006)  (.003)  (.005)  (.003)  (.003)  (.002)
Lagged  Employmentb  .802  .789  .012  -.014
(.004)  (.004)  (.004)  (.003)
Lagged Hourly Wage  _  _  _-  - .741
(.006)
Lagged  Value  Added  per  -.154  -.043  -.129  -.033  .194  .038
Worker  (.008)  (.004)  (.008)  (.004)  (.004)  (.003)
.412  .074  .609  .143  .343  .091
Industry  Trend  (.011)  (.006)  (.010)  (.006)  (.008)  (.006)
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Year Effects
.984  .996  .987  .997  .989  .995
R  2
a Obtained  by estimating  eqs. (14) and  (15) in the text. Standard  errors  in oarAnthesis.  LCQ=license  coverage  on output.  LCI=license  coverage  on inputs.
b  Lagged  dependent  variable:  employment  in (1) and  (2), hours  in (3) and (4).
27Table 8
Ratio of Production Workers to Total Employment
Year  All Industries  High  initial  Medium  initial  Low initial
protection  protection  protection
1984  .694  .732  ..678  .676
1985  .697  .735  .681  .678
1986  .688  .728  .672  .670
1987  .685  .726  .668  .666
1988  .684  .725  .666  .664
1989  .683  .727  .663  .662
1990  .684  .732  .665  .661
Skilled-Unskilled Wage Differentials
(Ratio  of wage  of non-production  workers  to wage  of production  workers)
Year  All Industries  High  initial  Mdium  initial  Low initial
protection  protection  protection
1984  2.115  1.976  2.116  2.241
1985  2.241  2.234  2.217  2.269
1986  2.099  2.088  2.031  2.173
1987  2.061  2.052  2.042  2.087
1988  2.214  2.190  2.262  2.191
1989  2.471  2.633  2.328  2.461
1990  2.711  2.956  2.567  2.629Table 9
Employment and Wage Equations, Production vs. Non-Production  Workerse
Employment  Wages
Variable  _  ||
Production  Non-Production  Production  Non-Production
Production  Wage  -.105  .308  .938
(.021)  (.023)  (.010)
Non-Production  -.041  -.051  .544
Wage  (.016)  (.017)  (.006)
Cost  of Capital  .517  .541  .018  .040
(.004)  (.005)  (.002)  (.003)
Price Raw  -.405  -.408  -.063  .021
Materials  (.026)  (.029)  (.011)  (.014)
Alternative  Wage  - _  .065  .034
(.007)  (.009)
1 - LCQ  -.131  -.102  -.010  .011
(.014)  (.015)  (.005)  (.007)
1 + Tariff  .273  .138  -.040  .010
(.017)  (.019)  (.007)  (.009)
LCI  -.128  -.048  -.015  .001
(.006)  (.007)  (.003)  (.003)
Lagged  .781  .782  -.005  -.006
Employmentb  (.005)  (.005)  (.003)  (.004)
Industry  Trend  .357  .142  .083  .107
(.012)  (.014)  (.007)  (.009)
Year Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes
RMSE  .810  .866  .332  .435
2  4185.9
a  Equations  estimated  jointly via GLS. Standard  errors in parenthesis.
b  X2test  for independence  of the residuals.Table 10
Employment Equations By Initial Protection Group
Variable  High  initial protection  Medium  initial protection  Low  initial protection
Prod  Non-Prod  Prod  Non-Prod  Prod  Non-Prod
1-LCQ  -.109  -.079  -.162  -.219  -.058  -.072
(.022)  (.023)  (.037)  (.039)  (.029)  (.031)
1  +Tariff  -.190  .149  .358  .199  .075  .112
(.073)  (.078)  (.058)  (.062)  (.026)  (.028)
LCI  .008  .053  -.161  .017  -.164  -.133
(.013)  (.015)  (.015)  (.016)  (.008)  (.009)
Equations also include the cost of capital, the  intermediate input price, the  own firm-specific wage, lagged
employment,  an industry-specific  trend,  and year dummies. Standard  errors  in parenthesis.
Wage Equations By Initial Protection Group
Variable  High initial protection  Medium  initial protection  Low  initial protection
Prod  Non-Prod  Prod  Non-Prod  Prod  Non-Prod
1-LCQ  -.022  -.010  .017  .033  -.021  -.047
(.009)  (.012)  (.017)  (.022)  (.013)  (.017)
1+Tariff  -.081  -.196  -.064  -.061  -.030  .027
(.033)  (.044)  (.027)  (.034)  (.011)  (.016)
LCI  -.066  -.034  -.003  .003  -.021  -.035
(.006)  (.008)  (.007)  (.009)  (.004)  (.005)
Equations  also include  the cost of capital,  the intermediate  input  price,  the alternative  wage, lagged  employment,  an
industry-specific  trend,  and year  dummies. Standard  errors in parenthesis.REFERENCES
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